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THE UNINDICTED CO-EJACULATOR AND 
NECROPHILIA: ADDRESSING 
PROSECUTORS’ LOGIC-DEFYING 




This article addresses a prosecutor’s development of new and bizarre 
theories, particularly in cases involving confession evidence, to explain away 
exculpatory DNA results. In Juan Rivera’s case, the prosecutor’s theory for 
why sperm found inside the 11-year-old victim on the day she was murdered 
did not belong to Rivera was that she had sex with someone before Rivera 
came along and raped (but did not ejaculate) and murdered her. The 
unnamed-lover theory is used so often by prosecutors that it has a moniker: 
“the unindicted co-ejaculator.” In the case of the Dixmoor Five, teenagers 
convicted of the rape and murder of a 14-year-old girl were exonerated after 
DNA from semen found on the victim’s body was linked to a man with a 
lengthy record of sexual assault and armed robbery. However, the state’s 
attorney accepted the possibility that the convicted rapist wandered past an 
open field and had sex with the deceased 14-year-old victim as a means of 
validating the teenagers’ confessions.  
The article explores strategies to prevent cases like Rivera’s, that are 
based on a prosecutor’s logic-defying theory of guilt, from moving forward. 
Although prosecutors enjoy largely unfettered discretion, they must account 
for their actions at different stages of the criminal proceedings before 
bringing cases to trial. During the investigation phase, recording 
 
* Professor of Law; Founder, Innocence Project Northwest—University of Washington 
School of Law. The author wishes to thank Daniel S. Medwed and Kathleen M. Ridolfi for 
their helpful comments, and Carolyn Hill, Reena Sikdar and other members of the Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology for convening the symposium honoring Rob Warden. 
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interrogations provides a measure of prosecutorial accountability. During 
the charging phase, acknowledging confirmation bias will guard against 
decisions to proceed in the face of contradictory exculpatory evidence. 
Potential judicial solutions, such as the doctrines of judicial estoppel and 
judicial admission and the proposed reform of criminal summary judgment, 
are advanced as additional means of preventing a case based upon a logic-
defying theory of guilt from proceeding to trial. This article examines the 
question of prosecutorial accountability through the lens of Juan Rivera’s 
case. Rivera spent almost twenty years in prison and underwent three trials 
before a court vacated his conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s theory of 
guilt, in the face of exculpatory DNA results, was “unreasonable” and 
“improbable.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
DNA technology can operate as a kind of truth machine, ensuring justice by identifying 
the guilty and clearing the innocent.1 
Prosecutors’ willingness to acknowledge the exculpatory value of 
postconviction DNA results has varied widely among jurisdictions. Some 
prosecutors have embraced DNA’s power to free innocent prisoners, going 
so far as to create “conviction integrity units” within their offices to 
investigate claims of actual innocence. 2  The nation’s first Conviction 
 
1 John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, Attorney General News Conference (Aug. 1, 
2001, 12:15 PM), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2001/080101newsconference 
dna.htm.  
2 See generally Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We 
Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 
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Integrity Unit, established in Dallas County, has proactively worked to 
exonerate thirty-four people, including someone who did not seek out the 
DNA testing that proved his innocence.3 
However, other prosecutors have developed new and bizarre theories, 
particularly in cases involving confession evidence, to explain away 
exculpatory DNA results. Many of the most outlandish and insidious theories 
were advanced against innocent suspects who falsely confessed and whose 
cases were championed by Rob Warden, the warrior for justice honored by 
this symposium. Warden, the co-founder and longtime Executive Director of 
the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of 
Law, dedicated his career to freeing innocent prisoners and remedying causes 
of wrongful conviction. His focus on exposing and eradicating false 
confessions is appropriate since the majority of Illinois’s known wrongful 
conviction cases involved false confessions. 4  Warden’s work has had a 
profound impact on innumerable people including Juan Rivera, the Dixmoor 
Five, and Jerry Hobbs. Each falsely confessed and were prosecuted despite 
exculpatory DNA tests which led to only one logical conclusion: They were 
innocent. 
In Rivera’s case, the prosecutor’s theory for why sperm found inside the 
eleven-year-old victim did not belong to Rivera was that she had sex with 
someone on the day she was murdered before Rivera came along and raped 
(but didn’t ejaculate) and murdered her.5 The unnamed-lover theory is used 
so often by prosecutors that it has its own moniker: “the unindicted co-
ejaculator.”6 In the case of the Dixmoor Five, teenagers convicted of the rape 
 
2250–56 (2010) (setting forth best practices for establishing conviction integrity units within 
prosecutors’ offices and arguing that these units, alongside professional integrity programs, 
will have the greatest success in preventing prosecutorial errors and misconduct).  
3 Yamiche Alcindor, Man’s Exoneration Makes History, USA TODAY, July 25, 2014, at 
3A (discussing the successful work of the Dallas County District Attorney’s Conviction 
Integrity Unit).  
4 Rob Warden, Whither False Confessions, 26 CBA REC., Feb.–Mar. 2012, at 28, 30 
(explaining that between 1986 and 2012, false confessions contributed to 52.9 percent of 
known Illinois wrongful convictions); see also TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS (Rob 
Warden & Steven A. Drizin eds., 2009) (assembling an anthology of thirty-eight articles 
chronicling false confessions cases). In TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS, the articles are 
grouped into categories with shared attributes—including brainwashing, fabrication, mental 
fragility, police force, and unrequited innocence—and the editors provide an introduction and 
postscript to each section. They end by discussing policy reforms that would reduce the 
phenomenon of false confessions.  
5 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 62–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
6 Mark A. Godsey, False Justice and the “True” Prosecutor: A Memoir, Tribute, and 
Commentary, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 789, 794–95 (2012).  
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and murder of a fourteen-year-old girl were exonerated after DNA from 
semen found on the victim’s body was linked to a man with a lengthy record 
of sexual assault and armed robbery.7 When the exculpatory postconviction 
evidence was presented to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, the 
State opined the convicted rapist engaged in necrophilia after wandering 
through a field and finding the deceased fourteen-year-old victim’s body.8 
And in the last example, Hobbs was detained and charged with murdering his 
eight-year-old daughter and her friend, but DNA testing later excluded Hobbs 
as the source of semen, spermatozoa, and other biological material found on 
evidence gathered from his daughter’s skirt and hands.9  A single male was 
determined to be the source of all of the DNA profiles.10 The prosecutor 
explained away the exculpatory DNA results by claiming the victim came 
into contact with the sperm while playing around the crime scene, a park 
where couples went to have sex.11 Two years later the DNA profile was 
matched to a convicted sex offender who was serving a sentence for attacking 
three women and also was awaiting trial on a murder charge.12 Moreover, the 
sex offender was friends with the second victim’s older brother.13 The same 
prosecutor then switched theories to posit—and this is hard to follow—that 
Hobbs’ daughter got the biological material on her hands while visiting the 
house and then transferred it to her clothes and genital area after the sex 
offender masturbated at the second victim’s home.14  
These and other examples demonstrate the extreme lengths to which 
some prosecutors will go to protect flawed convictions.15 The logic-defying 
 
7 Rebecca Stephens, Comment, Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those Who 
Plead Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and Recommendations 
for Reform, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309, 309–12 (2013).  
8 Richard Bierschbach et al., Panel 3 Juveniles in the Innocence Project: Current Cases 
in Practice, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 615, 617–18 (2012).  
9 Hobbs v. Cappelluti, 899 F. Supp. 2d 738, 751 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Hobbs was interrogated 
for twenty-four hours and detained for five years until he was exonerated by the DNA evidence 
and released. Id. at 746. 
10 Id. at 751. 
11 Id. 
12 Andrew Martin, The Prosecution’s Case Against DNA, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 27, 
2011, at 44. 
13 Id.  
14 See id. The prosecutor elaborated upon the theory: “They have popcorn-movie night, 
and the little girl is in the same bed where this guy did it . . . . How do we get colds? We touch 
our mouths, we touch our nose. What does a woman do after she urinates?” [The prosecutor 
then demonstrated a wiping action.] “Front to back, O.K.?” Id. 
15 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 894–900 (2004). In the case of the Central Park Five, 
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theories advanced by prosecutors run counter to the government’s 
fundamental interest in criminal prosecutions, “not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done.”16  
An overarching principle of our criminal justice system is that a 
prosecutor owes a duty of fairness to a defendant. 17  The majority of 
prosecutors are conscientious public servants who adhere to their ethical and 
constitutional obligations to ensure “that guilt shall not escape or innocence 
suffer.”18 The consequences of violating this principle are damaging and far-
reaching. Litigating cases against innocent suspects drains resources, 19 
devastates innocent defendants and their families, and harms public safety by 
allowing the actual perpetrator to remain free, often to commit additional 
 
postconviction DNA testing on semen found on the assault victim’s clothing matched a serial 
rapist, Matias Reyes, and excluded the five juveniles who were convicted of the crime. Id. at 
898. Despite Reyes’ statement that he acted alone, police officers advanced several theories in 
which Reyes and the five juveniles could have colluded in the assaults. Id. at 900. See also 
Hilary S. Ritter, Note, It’s the Prosecution’s Story, but They’re Not Sticking to It: Applying 
Harmless Error and Judicial Estoppel to Exculpatory Postconviction DNA Testing Cases, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 826 (2005). When postconviction DNA tests excluded Roy Criner as 
a contributor to semen in the deceased victim’s vaginal and rectal specimens, the State argued 
the victim was “promiscuous” as an explanation for why the evidence was not exonerating. 
Id. 
16 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  
17 See, e.g., State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556 (Wash. 2011) (“The prosecutor owes a 
duty to defendants to see that their rights to a constitutionally fair trial are not violated.”); In 
re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Minn. 2011) (“The prosecutor’s duty ‘to see that justice is 
done on behalf of both the victim and the defendant’ overrides any individual or governmental 
interest in winning cases.”); People v. Cochran, 145 N.E. 207, 214 (Ill. 1924) (“The state’s 
attorney in his official capacity is the representative of all the people, including the defendant, 
and it was as much his duty to safeguard the constitutional rights of the defendant as those of 
any other citizen.”). 
18 Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. 
19 In addition to the cost of the criminal case, financial expenditures can include defending 
lawsuits based on police misconduct. See Karen Hawkins, Chicago Still Paying for Police 
Torture Claims, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 16, 2011, available at LEXIS, Associated Press 
database (reporting the city of Chicago has spent at least $43 million defending lawsuits again 
one former Chicago police commander).   
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crimes,20 which leads to an erosion of trust in the criminal justice system.21 
The question becomes why our criminal justice system lacks sufficient 
safeguards to prevent a case built upon a logic-defying theory of guilt from 
moving forward to trial. Although prosecutors enjoy largely unfettered 
discretion, they must account for their actions at different stages of the 
criminal proceedings before bringing cases to trial. 
This article will examine the question of prosecutorial accountability 
through the lens of Juan Rivera’s case. Rivera spent almost twenty years in 
prison and underwent three trials before a court vacated his conviction, 
holding that the State’s theory of guilt, in the face of exculpatory DNA 
results, was “unreasonable” and “improbable.”22 Rivera was charged in 1992 
with the brutal rape and murder of a young girl after he falsely confessed.23 
He was convicted in 1993 and when his conviction was reversed based on 
the cumulative effect of trial errors, he was retried and reconvicted in 1998.24 
In 2004, Rivera requested postconviction DNA testing, and in 2006, the court 
granted his motion for a new trial based on the exculpatory test results.25 The 
DNA profile of the perpetrator was uploaded into the felon database, but no 
match resulted. 26  Rivera’s third trial occurred in 2009, after DNA tests 
conducted in 2005 excluded him as the source of semen found on the victim.27 
The prosecutor obtained a conviction at Rivera’s 2009 trial by arguing the 
exculpatory DNA evidence was either a result of contamination (which every 
expert discounted as improbable) or was deposited by the eleven-year-old 
victim’s unknown and unidentified sexual partner.28 Rivera was exonerated 
 
20 See, e.g., Peter Modaferri, Patricia Robinson & Phyllis McDonald, When the Guilty 
Walk Free: The Role of Police in Preventing Wrongful Convictions, THE POLICE CHIEF, vol. 
77, no. 10, at 34 (Oct. 2010), http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/CPIM1010/#/34 
(reporting the Innocence Project’s documentation of forty-seven rapes and nineteen murders 
committed by people who remained at large because an innocent person was wrongly 
convicted of the crime they committed). 
21 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 57 (2008) 
(“Exoneration cases have altered the ways judges, lawyers, legislators, the public, and scholars 
perceive the criminal justice system’s accuracy.”). 
22 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 61, 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
23 Id. at 55. 
24 Id.; Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 85, People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011) (No. 09-1060) (discussing errors leading to reversal). 
25 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 56. 
26 Id. Rivera filed a lawsuit to compel the Federal Bureau of Investigation to compare the 
DNA recovered from the semen found in the victim against its national databank. Rivera v. 
Mueller, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1164–65 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
27 Id.  
28 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 59, 62–63. 
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in 2012 after the Illinois Court of Appeals (hereinafter “Rivera Court” or 
“Court”) held there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.29 The 
Rivera Court found the State’s theories of guilt “distort to an absurd degree 
the real and undisputed testimony that the sperm was deposited shortly before 
the victim died.”30 In vacating the conviction, the Court acknowledged the 
impact its decision would have on the victim’s family and friends who had 
suffered great anguish from her murder, and on Rivera’s family and friends 
who had “suffered the nightmare of wrongful incarceration.”31 
Part II of this article will discuss the importance of DNA exonerations 
in the criminal justice system, how a false confession led to Rivera’s 
conviction, and why exculpatory DNA results led to his exoneration. Part III 
will explore the prosecutor’s role in obtaining the confession during Rivera’s 
investigation and the reform movement to record custodial interrogations that 
occurred after his first conviction. Part IV will address a prosecutor’s 
charging decision, how this process might contribute to solidifying a 
prosecutor’s view of guilt in the face of contradictory exculpatory evidence, 
and suggested reforms to guard against charging innocent defendants. Part V 
will examine potential judicial solutions to these problems, such as the 
doctrines of judicial estoppel and judicial admission and the proposed reform 
of criminal summary judgment, all of which have been advanced as pre-trial 
means of preventing the State from advancing inconsistent theories or 
proceeding to trial when there is sufficient evidence to charge, but not to 
convict. Part VI will present the postscript to Rivera’s case.  
II. RIVERA’S FALSE CONFESSION— 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM DNA EXONERATIONS  
Prior to 1993, when Rivera first went to trial, eleven people had been 
exonerated on the basis of postconviction DNA testing.32 The importance of 
DNA in criminal investigations cannot be overstated. To date, more than 330 
people have been exonerated after postconviction DNA testing established, 
to a scientific certainty, they were imprisoned for crimes they did not 
 
29 The prosecutor did not appeal the Court of Appeals’ decision. Mitch Dudek, Set Free 
After More Than 19 Years, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at 2. 
30 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 63. 
31 Id. at 67–68. 
32 Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx (providing 
the following breakdown of DNA exonerations by year: 1989 (2); 1990 (1); 1991 (3); and 
1992 (5)). 
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commit.33 The growth in DNA exonerations is in part due to advances in 
technology which allow forensic analysts to obtain profiles from minute 
traces of biological material previously untestable because the sample was 
too small or was degraded.34 Current DNA technology can obtain profiles 
from minuscule samples of saliva, semen, sweat, skin cells, and cellular 
material found in the root of a hair.35 Those profiles are uploaded into the 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a vast, computerized state and 
federal registry containing over 11 million convicted-felon DNA profiles.36 
Thus, postconviction DNA testing not only has the power to free innocent 
prisoners, but can also identify the actual perpetrator through a match in the 
CODIS data bank or comparison against an alternate suspect.37 In nearly half 
of the first 330 DNA exonerations, the true perpetrator was identified through 
the database, or matched to a known profile, after a wrongfully convicted 
prisoner’s exoneration.38 
Rivera’s nearly twenty-year nightmare of wrongful conviction began 
with a horrific crime. On August 17, 1992, an eleven-year-old girl was 
brutally murdered in Waukegan, Illinois.39 She suffered twenty-seven stab 
 
33 THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (listing current DNA 
exonerations).  
34 See Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech 
Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1470 
n.109 (2007) (“The first DNA test . . . [required] a sample of biological material that was at 
least the size of a quarter. Subsequent development . . . revolutionized DNA testing by 
allowing samples of DNA contained in biological evidence to be copied without affecting the 
original sample.”). 
35 NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SPECIAL REPORT: USING DNA TO SOLVE 
COLD CASES (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf.  
36  FBI CODIS–NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi. 
gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics. 
37 DNA typing’s unique power to exonerate an innocent suspect who falsely confessed, as 
well as identify the true perpetrator, came to light during its first use in a criminal investigation. 
In 1986, Scotland Yard obtained a graphic confession from Richard Buckland, in which he 
admitted to the brutal rape and strangulation of two women in separate incidents. To solidify 
the cases against Buckland, police called upon Dr. Alec Jeffreys, who had recently developed 
a process of DNA typing. They submitted semen samples from both crimes to Jeffreys for 
DNA analysis. Jeffreys’ conclusion, which stunned the police and the community, was that 
both girls had been raped by the same perpetrator, but Buckland was not that man. The police 
investigation ultimately led to Colin Pitchfork and subsequent DNA tests linked Pitchfork to 
the crimes. See HENRY C. LEE & FRANK TIRNADY, BLOOD EVIDENCE: HOW DNA IS 
REVOLUTIONIZING THE WAY WE SOLVE CRIMES 1–2 (2003). 
38 DNA Exonerations Nationwide, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT (Sep. 13, 2015, 9:32 PM), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-
exonerations-nationwide. 
39 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
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wounds, was strangled, and incurred massive injuries as a result of having 
been vaginally and anally penetrated.40 Six weeks later, police focused their 
attention on Juan Rivera, a nineteen-year-old former special education 
student with an IQ of 79, after a jailhouse informant told them Rivera had 
information about the killer.41 Rivera voluntarily met with the police, agreed 
to provide them with samples of his blood and hair, and signed a statement 
describing a man he saw in the crime scene vicinity who was acting 
suspiciously and who had a fresh scratch on his face.42  
When police found reason to doubt Rivera’s statement,43 they began an 
interrogation process that lasted four days and involved no fewer than ten law 
enforcement officers.44 The interrogation culminated in more than twenty-
four hours of near constant questioning, during which Rivera was deprived 
of sleep.45 In the first three days, although Rivera gave varying accounts of 
his whereabouts on the evening of the crime, he maintained his innocence.46 
On the fourth day of the interrogation, around midnight, police once again 
called Rivera a liar and accused him of being in the apartment with the 
victim.47 At this point, Rivera broke down, sobbed uncontrollably to the point 
of soaking his clothes, and nodded in the affirmative.48 He then told a new 
story about his activities on the evening of the crime and implicated himself 
in the murder.49 At 3 a.m., police typed a three-page statement for Rivera to 
sign, summarizing his new version of events.50 However, Rivera’s statement 
was inconsistent with facts gathered during the crime investigation.51  
Police then consulted with the State’s Attorney and provided him with 
 
40 Id. at 56. 
41 Id. at 60, 64; Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 4 (describing why the 
police began to focus on Rivera); Brief of Innocence Network at 4, Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53 
(No. 09-1060) (documenting Rivera’s age at the time of his arrest).  
42 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 56. 
43 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 9 (Rivera told police he was at a party 
on the evening of the crime. Their follow-up investigation “revealed there was no party . . . 
triggering an interest in interviewing Rivera further.”). 
44 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 67. 
45 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 6–17, 58. The two investigators who 
began the interrogation were so exhausted by the fourth day they could not continue and asked 
for replacements from a fresh team of interrogators. Id. at 13. 
46 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57; Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 4–9 (detailing 
what occurred during the days of interrogation leading up to Rivera’s admission). 
47 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 8–9. 
48 Id. at 9. 
49 Id. at 9–10. 
50 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57. 
51 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 13, 27.  
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Rivera’s statement, discussing how it diverged from, and contradicted, 
evidence gathered during the murder investigation.52 The group decided more 
interrogation was necessary to clear up the inconsistencies.53 During the final 
interrogation session, police asked Rivera pointed questions about facts in his 
initial confession statement which they considered untrue and in response, 
Rivera changed a number of facts.54 Following this, police typed up a new 
three-page document to present to Rivera.55 It incriminated Rivera in the 
victim’s murder and was different from the earlier statement. It included 
many of the key facts the prosecutor and police had considered problematic 
in Rivera’s earlier statement and had sought to clarify.56 Rivera signed the 
statement and was charged with capital murder.57 
At the 2009 trial, where DNA evidence excluding Rivera and 
identifying the profile of an unknown male was presented, Rivera’s 
confession was the centerpiece of the State’s case. The trial prosecutor argued 
Rivera knew details “that only the killer would know and that were even 
unknown to the investigators themselves.”58 In its 2011 opinion, the Rivera 
Court rejected this argument, instead finding the evidence supported the 
inference that police fed information to Rivera during the interrogation.59 
Although the Court did not give the full details of the four-day interrogation 
process, as discussed in Part III infra, a complete picture reveals that Rivera 
was a vulnerable young man who was subjected to an abusive and coercive 
interrogation that resulted in his psychological breakdown, infliction of self-
harm, and a false confession.60 The Rivera Court acknowledged “[i]nnocent 
people do confess to crimes they did not commit” and found the evidence 
supported an inference that the details Rivera provided police “were the result 
of psychological suggestion or linguistic manipulation.”61 The Rivera Court 
also found that the jailhouse informant evidence presented by the State was 
 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 66–67; Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 14–17. 
55 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57. 
56 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 15–17. 
57 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 57. The prosecutor sought a death sentence, but the 1993 jury 
declined to impose it. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 17. 
58 Id. at 94. 
59 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 66–67. 
60 Although the court never mentions Rivera’s age at the time of the interrogation, it states, 
without detailing the evidence, the defense presented testimony from jail employees about 
Rivera’s mental and physical condition during the interrogation, as well as expert testimony 
regarding Rivera’s mental health; his IQ of 79; and his third-grade reading level. Id. at 60.  
61 Id. at 65, 67. 
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insufficient to support the conviction, citing the inherent unreliability of 
informants, exposure of the “blatant motivations” of the informants who 
testified against Rivera to act out of self-interest, and the DNA evidence.62 
Ultimately, it was the exculpatory DNA evidence which led the Rivera 
Court to take the unusual step of reversing the trial court judgment on the 
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.63 In doing 
so, the Court rejected the two alternate theories the State offered in response 
to the DNA results: (1) they resulted from contamination of the samples, and 
(2) the eleven-year-old victim was sexually active in the days before the 
murder.64 The Court deemed both theories “highly improbable,” finding that 
no reasonable fact finder could credit them beyond a reasonable doubt.65 
Notably, the scientific evidence did not support the contamination theory, 
since both the State and defense forensic experts testified that there was no 
such evidence.66 Because the State did not present any evidence the victim 
was in a relationship with another man, 67 the Court found that the State’s 
theories “distort to an absurd degree the real and undisputed evidence that the 
sperm was deposited shortly before the victim died.”68 In short, the Court 
reasoned “the DNA evidence provides no support to the State’s theory that 
[the] defendant was the individual who committed the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt; rather, the DNA evidence embedded reasonable doubt 
deep into the State’s theory.”69 
III. PROSECUTORS’ ROLE DURING AN INVESTIGATION 
Prosecutors may be brought into an investigation prior to a suspect’s 
arrest, as they were during Rivera’s case, to shape the investigation’s 
 
62 Id. at 64–65. One informant had tried to sell Rivera’s discovery materials to a reporter; 
the other lived with Rivera’s family but was forced to leave for using drugs in the family’s 
home. Id. at 64. 
63 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 67; see Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, 
and the Civil-Criminal Division, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 478 (2004) (“[T]here appears to be 
universal agreement that appellate courts almost never reverse convictions on sufficiency 
grounds[.]”). 
64 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 62–63. 
65 Id. at 62–63. 
66 Id. at 58–59. 
67 The prosecutor, in support of the unnamed lover theory, presented testimony from the 
victim’s twin sister, who testified that when they were eight years old, a neighbor forced them 
to perform oral sex, and that she and the victim once showed each other how they masturbated. 
Id. at 58, 62–63. 
68 Id. at 63. 
69 Id. at 62. 
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direction and scope.70 Rivera’s final confession, procured after consultation 
with the prosecutor, was used by the State at the 2009 trial to counter the 
exculpatory DNA evidence. The prosecutor continued to give the confession 
more weight than the scientific evidence, despite the questionable 
circumstances of the confession. Moreover, between Rivera’s first and third 
trials, a significant body of research had developed which further undermined 
the confession’s reliability.71 However, Rivera’s jury did not have the benefit 
of objectively evaluating the reliability of his confession because the 
interrogation was not recorded72 and the trial court excluded expert testimony 
on false confessions. 73  Although there is little to no oversight of a 
 
70 See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their 
Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 733–37 (1999) (describing the recent expansion 
of a prosecutor’s investigative role, which includes: seeking search warrants or electronic 
surveillance orders; authorizing and supervising undercover operations; participating in, or 
directing interviews of witnesses; requesting voice exemplars, fingerprints, or other physical 
evidence from suspects and witnesses; and offering plea deals to informants in return for 
undercover assistance in cases and later testimony).  
71 See, e.g., GISLI H. GUDIONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS 
AND TESTIMONY (2003) (summarizing decades of theoretical and empirical social science 
research on interrogations and confessions, analyzing how interrogation tactics can lead to 
false confessions); RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008) 
(examining the history of interrogation in America, discussing causes and consequences of 
false confessions, and reviewing and analyzing policy reforms); Danielle E. Chojnacki, 
Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert 
Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 17–19 (2008) (documenting the 
association of certain interrogation tactics—isolation, extended interrogations, 
“minimization,” and “maximization”—with  false confessions); Drizin & Leo, supra note 15 
(analyzing 125 cases where postconviction DNA testing exonerated individuals who falsely 
confessed); Richard A. Leo, Steven A. Drizin, Peter J. Neufeld, Bradley R. Hall & Amy 
Vatner, Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-
First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 512–20 (2006) (discussing empirical research on police 
interrogations and false confessions); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences 
of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of 
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (reporting a study of 
sixty cases of police-induced false confessions); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The 
Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979 
(1997) (describing and analyzing “why contemporary interrogation methods, if misdirected, 
used ineptly, or utilized improperly, sometimes convince ordinary, psychologically and 
intellectually normal individuals to falsely confess”). 
72 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 10 (“According to the officers, there 
were video and audio recorders readily available nearby, but Rivera declined their invitation 
to have his statement taped[.]”). 
73 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 55 (“[T]he trial court excluded certain expert witness testimony 
relating to the effect [Rivera’s] psychiatric and psychological conditions were apt to have had 
on him and on the reliability of his statements during questioning using particular interrogative 
techniques.”). 
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prosecutor’s actions during the investigatory phase of a case,74 the movement 
to record custodial interrogations provides a measure of accountability during 
this stage of the criminal case.    
The prosecutor met with investigators after Rivera gave his first 
incriminating statement to discuss how to address facts in the statement law 
enforcement officers knew to be false. 75  The confession was central to 
indicting Rivera because no eyewitnesses or physical evidence connected 
him to the crime.76 Yet the length of the interrogation and Rivera’s assertions 
of innocence, followed by incriminating statements conflicting with the 
crime scene evidence, should have given the prosecutor pause in moving 
forward with the continued interrogation.77 As more details emerged about 
the psychological and physical distress endured by Rivera, it is even more 
difficult to accept the prosecutor’s endorsement of the confession. During the 
third night of questioning, Rivera suffered a psychological breakdown.78 As 
he was experiencing this mental collapse, his interrogators hog-tied him, 
cuffing his hands together around one of his legs and wrapping the chain that 
ran between his leg shackles around the center of his handcuffs, so that he 
could not move at all.79 Jail personnel observed Rivera in a catatonic state—
eyes open but entirely unresponsive; they noticed that he had wounds from 
hitting his head against the wall of the interrogation room.80 After that, Rivera 
was put in a padded “rubber room,” designated for detainees who present a 
risk for suicide. 81  A psychiatric nurse who observed Rivera shortly 
afterwards diagnosed him with acute psychosis and testified he “was not in 
touch with the reality of what was going on around him.”82 When she checked 
on him later in the morning, she saw he was curled up in a fetal position in 
the corner of the rubber room and observed he had torn out pieces of his 
scalp.83 The medical professionals at the jail prescribed Rivera anti-psychotic 
and other medications, which were not administered since Rivera’s shackles 
 
74 Little, supra note 70, at 746–50 (describing the historical development of “[t]he 
virtually unreviewable status of prosecutorial review”).  
75 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 13, 27. 
76 Rivera, 962 N.E.2d at 61 (“The State acknowledges that there was no eyewitness 
testimony or forensic evidence positively connecting defendant with the crime.”). 
77 Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 948 (finding that eighty-four percent of false confessions 
occurred after interrogations of six hours or longer). 
78 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 11–14. 
79 Id. at 13–14. 
80 Id. at 11. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 11–12. 
83 Id. at 12. 
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restrained him from engaging in self-injurious behavior. 84  Yet, when 
investigators retrieved Rivera from the rubber room and brought him to an 
interrogation room for the final round of questioning, they claimed not to 
notice anything unusual about his demeanor.85  
As Rivera’s case poignantly illustrates, a confession is given 
tremendous weight by a jury, resulting in a conviction even in the absence of 
evidence corroborating the confession.86 The idea that an individual would 
confess to a crime, particularly a horrific crime such as murder, without being 
subject to physical torture is difficult to comprehend. However, false 
confessions are now known to be a common factor in convicting the 
innocent.87 It is important to note that the officer conducting the interrogation 
is not embarking upon an objective fact-gathering mission. Rather, the 
investigator’s sole purpose, as it was in Rivera’s case, is to obtain a 
confession, or at minimum incriminating statements and admissions, in order 
to bolster the prosecution’s case.88 When the interrogation process is not 
recorded, tactics used by interrogators to elicit confessions cannot be 
objectively evaluated, misconduct is harder to detect, and supervisors do not 
have the opportunity to monitor and improve interrogation methods.  
By the time of Rivera’s third trial in 2009, a large body of research had 
developed explaining how and why the strategies of modern psychological 
interrogation can lead innocent persons to confess.89 This research confirms 
that Rivera’s interrogation bears hallmarks of a false confession. His personal 
characteristics and certain situational factors—the length of the interrogation, 
sleep deprivation, and his re-interrogation after providing false 
information—are now associated with false confessions. Specifically, 
research shows that interrogations that last more than six hours are 
 
84 Id. at 14. 
85 Id. 
86 Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 960 (discussing data showing false confessors, i.e., 
individuals who later proved to have false confessions, who chose to take their cases to trial 
stood more than eighty percent chance of conviction). 
87 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 8 (2011) (discussing how in the first 250 DNA exonerations, 
sixteen percent confessed to crimes they did not commit).  
88 Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 911 (“[T]he singular purpose of American police 
interrogation is to elicit incriminating statements and admissions—ideally a full confession—
in order to assist the State in its prosecution of the defendant.”).  
89 See supra note 71 (citing books and articles on police interrogation and false confessions 
published prior to 2009). 
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disproportionately likely to lead to false confessions.90 Younger suspects are 
more likely to confess more readily than older suspects, as are suspects who 
have low IQs.91 Individuals suffering from a psychiatric disorder may be 
vulnerable because they are unable to distinguish fact from fantasy.92 One of 
the particular ways in which sleep deprivation heightens susceptibility is to 
make individuals more suggestible and less able to exercise good judgment.93 
When a suspect first provides an obviously inaccurate confession and is then 
interrogated further to secure a statement that more closely fits the crime, 
there is heightened risk that the final confession is false.94 Assessing whether 
interrogators revealed crime details to a suspect during an interrogation can 
only be objectively determined if the interrogation process is videotaped. 
In 2003, Illinois became the first state to enact legislation requiring 
police to record interrogations of suspects in homicide cases.95 The law was 
enacted in the wake of dozens of Illinois exonerations, many from death row, 
involving false confessions.96 Had this reform been in place in 1992, it would 
have allowed Rivera’s jury to have an objective, thorough, and reviewable 
record of what took place in the interrogation room over the four days of 
interrogation. It would have allowed the jury to gauge how much information 
was fed to Rivera during the interrogation. And, it would have given the jury 
a visual, rather than verbal, account of Rivera’s mental and physical 
condition during the interrogation process.97 At present, seventeen states and 
the District of Columbia mandate, either by statute or court rule, the 
 
90 Drizin & Leo, supra note 15, at 948 (finding that eighty-four percent of false confessions 
occurred after interrogations of six hours or longer).  
91 Chojnacki, Cicchini & White, supra note 71, at 16. 
92 Id. at 16–17. 
93 Id. at 17. 
94 GARRETT, supra note 87, at 33–34 (discussing how in seventy-five percent of the cases, 
the innocent suspect provided facts during the interrogation that were inconsistent with the 
crime). 
95 Rick Pearson, Taped Confessions to be Law: State Will Be 1st to Pass Legislation, CHI. 
TRIB., July 17, 2003, at 1. In 2013, Illinois’s mandatory recording law was expanded beyond 
homicide cases to include interrogations of people accused of any of eight other violent 
felonies. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.1(b-5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2015); see also Act 
effective Jan. 1, 2014, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-547 (West) (amending the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1963). 
96 Steve A. Drizin, Good Reason to Tape Suspect’s Interrogation: It’s Done for Accused 
Cops; Defendants Deserve No Less, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 30, 2002, at 36. 
97 The trial testimony regarding Rivera’s mental and physical condition varied. While 
medical and correctional professionals testified that Rivera suffered a physical and mental 
breakdown detailed in Part II, supra, his interrogators described Rivera as being “comfortable” 
and “relaxed.” See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 15. 
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electronic recording of interrogations98; thirty-three states have not adopted 
this leading safeguard against convicting innocent defendants based on false 
confessions.99 
IV. THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE IN A CHARGING DECISION 
As Professor Daniel S. Medwed, a scholar on prosecutorial ethics, 
argues:  
The charging decision is the tipping point for a criminal case. If the prosecutor declines 
to charge, the case disappears with few repercussions. If the prosecutor files charges, 
the state’s efforts tilt towards developing a case. And once the wheels of a criminal case 
are set in motion toward trial, the chance of a wrongful conviction increases.100  
The prosecutor charged Rivera by indictment and obtained a conviction 
before DNA tests were conducted. 101  However, as discussed below, the 
charging process may have contributed to solidifying the prosecutor’s view 
of guilt, resulting in the prosecutor’s subsequent unreasonable rejection of 
exculpatory postconviction DNA results. Many scholars have called for 
increasing the level of proof required to charge a defendant as a means of 
guarding against convicting innocent defendants. 102  However, Professor 
Alafair S. Burke, a former prosecutor, has drawn upon empirical research on 
cognitive bias to argue that elevating the standard of proof will only result in 
a prosecutor adhering more ardently to a theory of guilt even in the face of 
exculpatory evidence.103 As an alternative to raising the standard of proof, 
she urges prosecutors to engage in office-wide education and training on the 
 
98 Thomas P. Sullivan, Arguing for Statewide Uniformity in Recording Custodial 
Interrogations, 29 SEC. CRIM. JUST. 21, 25 (2014). 
99 Id. at 24–25 (reporting a New York State task force “ultimately determined that 
electronic recording of interrogations was simply too critical to identifying false confessions 
and preventing wrongful convictions to recommend as a voluntary, rather than mandatory, 
reform”). 
100 DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 34 (2012). 
101 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (noting that Rivera’s motion 
for postconviction DNA testing was granted in 2004). 
102 MEDWED, supra note 100, at 19 (“Lifting the standard from probable cause to a level 
that comes closer to approximating the threshold for establishing guilt at trial (proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt) would certainly help weed out borderline cases and spare some innocent 
suspects.”).  
103 Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lesson of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1605–07 (2006) (describing how a prosecutor who 
personally believes a defendant is guilty may “accept at face value any evidence that supports 
the theory of guilt” and “interpret ambiguous evidence in a manner that strengthens her faith 
in the case”).  
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role cognitive bias plays in the exercise of discretion in charging decisions. 
Prosecutors enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to bring 
charges against an individual either by indictment or information. 104 
However they are ethically bound to only file a criminal charge supported by 
probable cause; a prosecutor must present sufficient evidence, either to a 
grand jury or to a judge, to support a “reasonable ground for belief of 
guilt.”105 As a practical matter, the prosecutor’s charging decision receives 
little scrutiny.106 It is virtually unreviewable, unless a defendant can meet the 
high burden of proving prejudice from a charging decision based on 
prosecutorial vindictiveness.107 
Scholars have criticized the probable cause standard as an insufficient 
means of preventing the initiation of criminal charges against innocent 
defendants.108 They have urged prosecutors to be “morally certain that the 
defendant is both factually and legally guilty”109 and to only proceed if they 
are “personally convinced of the defendant’s guilt.”110 Those admonishments 
have been endorsed by the ABA and by the National District Attorneys 
Association. The ABA’s Prosecution Function Standards adopt the probable 
cause standard for initiating criminal charges and contain a higher standard 
 
104 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute, the decision whether . . . to prosecute . . . generally rests entirely in his discretion.”); 
see also Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and 
the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2188–96 (2010) (discussing 
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions and its role in the prosecution of innocent 
suspects in the Duke lacrosse case). 
105 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (internal citation omitted) (“The 
substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”). 
106 MEDWED, supra note 100, at 15 (“With some exceptions, charging decisions are 
essentially exempt from judicial review on the grounds that courts lack the expertise and 
access to evidence to second-guess these choices.”).  
107 See Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes: A Proposal for Defensive 
Summary Judgment in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 666–69 (2011). To prove a 
claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant has to establish either (1) actual 
vindictiveness, or (2) a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness that will give rise to a presumption 
of vindictiveness. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374, 376, 380–81 (1982). The 
burden then shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable, 
objective reasons. Id. at 374, 376 n.8. 
108 MEDWED, supra note 100, at 19 (“Many scholars have derided [the probable cause 
standard] as woefully inadequate in protecting the innocent.”). 
109 Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging 
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522 (1993). 
110 Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 
316, 338–39 (2001). 
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for maintaining such charges, mandating that a prosecutor “should not 
institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal 
charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a 
conviction.”111 Similarly, the National Prosecution Standards, issued by the 
National District Attorneys Association, also set a higher bar than the 
“probable cause” standard. These prosecutorial standards call upon a 
prosecutor to file “only those charges which he or she reasonably believes 
can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.”112  
The well-intentioned efforts to increase the amount of proof needed to 
charge suspects may have the unintended consequence of impeding 
prosecutors from rationally processing information because they are 
ensconced in their belief that the defendant is guilty. Professor Burke has 
written about the role cognitive bias plays in prosecutorial decision 
making. 113  She discusses empirical research showing that cognitive bias 
renders people’s beliefs imperfect and resistant to change through: 
confirmation bias (“the tendency to seek to confirm, rather than disconfirm, 
any hypothesis under study”),114  selective information processing (which 
“causes people to overvalue information that is consistent with their 
preexisting theories and to undervalue information that challenges those 
theories”),115 belief perseverance (“the human tendency to continue to adhere 
to a theory, even after the evidence underlying the theory is disproved”),116 
and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance.117 From this, Burke posits that 
after prosecutors make personal determinations about the defendant’s guilt, 
they will process additional evidence on a selective basis.118 They will seek 
out information consistent with their theory of guilt, adhere to the theory even 
after it is disproved, and find explanations for exculpatory evidence that 
 
111 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993).  
112 NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 4-2.2 (3d ed. 
1991) (“A prosecutor should file charges that he or she believes adequately encompass the 
accused’s criminal activity and which he or she reasonably believes can be substantiated by 
admissible evidence at trial.”).  
113 See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) (describing how cognitive bias can thwart prosecutors from 
making neutral decisions and proposing a series of prosecutor-initiated reforms to counter the 
effects of cognitive bias); Burke, supra note 103, at 1587. 
114 Burke, supra note 103, at 1593–96. 
115 Id. at 1594, 1596–99. 
116 Id. at 1594, 1599–1601. 
117 Id. at 1593–94, 1601–02. 
118 Id. at 1605–06. 
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undermine the reliability of the evidence or reconcile it with the theory of 
guilt.119 In other words, according to Burke’s research, the more firmly a 
prosecutor believes in a suspect’s guilt, the more irrationally he or she will 
adhere to a theory of guilt in the face of exculpatory evidence.120 
Burke proposes alternatives to raising the probable cause standard, 
which focus on improving the quality of prosecutorial decision-making.121 
Those reforms include training prosecutors about the role cognitive bias plays 
in their decision-making, 122  encouraging prosecutors to engage in the 
practice of “switching sides” by generating pro-defense arguments to their 
interpretations of evidence,123 and establishing a process for “fresh looks” of 
a file by a lawyer or committee of neutral lawyers, which may include judges, 
defense attorneys, or civil practitioners.124  
It is unlikely that elevating the burden of proof required to charge 
defendants would have led the State to disengage the wheels of Juan Rivera’s 
third trial. At trial, the prosecutor argued Rivera’s confession constituted 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt and was enough to overcome 
the exculpatory DNA evidence. It is possible that the prosecutors—by 
proceeding to trial on a theory of guilt the Rivera Court found “absurd,” 
“improbable,” and “unreasonable”—were operating under the constraints of 
confirmation bias.125 However, as discussed in Part VI infra, allegations of 
misconduct surfaced during Rivera’s civil law suit, which call into question 
a confirmation bias analysis. Prosecutors who make egregious charging 
decisions should, as Medwed and other scholars urge, face disciplinary 
proceedings and sanctions.126 
  
 
119 Id. at 1605–07. 
120 Id. at 1590 (“Perhaps prosecutors sometimes fail to make decisions that rationally 
further justice, not because they fail to value justice, but because they are, in fact, irrational. 
They are irrational because they are human, and all human decision makers share a common 
set of information-processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality.”). 
121 Id. at 1631. 
122 Id. at 1616–18. 
123 Id. at 1618–20. 
124 Id. at 1621–24. 
125 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 61, 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
126 MEDWED, supra note 100, at 29–34.  
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V. THE REMEDIES OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL,  
JUDICIAL ADMISSION & SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
Ultimately, the damaging consequences of prosecuting innocent 
defendants occur regardless of whether prosecutors pursue an improbable 
case theory, “not because they are bad, but because they are human,”127 
through overzealousness,128 or because of misconduct.129 Judicial pre-trial 
interventions, which do not rely on prosecutorial discretion or self-regulation, 
have been advanced as means to prevent a case built upon a logic-defying 
theory of guilt from moving forward to trial. These solutions include the 
doctrines of judicial estoppel and judicial admission and the proposed reform 
of criminal summary judgment.   
When prosecutors develop a new theory of guilt in response to 
exculpatory postconviction DNA evidence, it often contradicts the position 
they asserted at the defendant’s trial to obtain the conviction. For example, 
in Rivera’s case, the prosecutor argued at the 2009 trial that the eleven-year-
old victim was sexually active, a theory that was not advanced at previous 
trials.130 However, Rivera’s case is not the only example of a prosecutor 
advancing new theories in the face of exculpatory DNA results. For example, 
when postconviction DNA testing excluded Earl Washington as the source 
of semen found on a rape and murder victim, Virginia prosecutors argued 
that an unidentified accomplice—the unindicted co-ejaculator—joined 
Washington in the crime.131 And in Florida, the State also took a position 
inconsistent with what it had presented at trial in Wilton Dedge’s case. 
Although prosecutors argued at Dedge’s trial that pubic hairs found on the 
victim’s bed matched Dedge, when postconviction DNA testing (which the 
 
127 Burke, supra note 103, at 1591 (drawing on social science literature to explain the role 
cognitive bias may play in causing even virtuous and ethical prosecutors to contribute to 
wrongful convictions). 
128 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Postconviction 
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125, 134–36, 150–56 (2004) (discussing how political 
pressures to obtain convictions can create a prosecutorial office culture that values winning 
over justice); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual 
Framework, 15 AM J. CRIM. L. 197, 204–13 (1988) (describing factors causing prosecutors to 
pursue cases overzealously).  
129 Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A 
Fundamental Failure to Do Justice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1337–38, 1348–64 (2007) 
(describing the prosecutor’s misconduct in the Duke lacrosse case, which ultimately led to his 
sanction and disbarment). 
130 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 61, 62–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
131 Aviva Orenstein, Facing The Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in 
Postconviction Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 413 (2011).  
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prosecution opposed) excluded him as the source of the hair, they argued the 
results were insignificant.132  
Scholars have suggested, and case law supports, using the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel to prevent prosecutors from responding to exculpatory DNA 
test results by advancing a new theory of guilt that contradicts the factual 
theory relied upon at the defendant’s original trial.133 Judicial estoppel is an 
equitable doctrine precluding a party who asserts one position in a court 
proceeding from later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly inconsistent 
position in another court proceeding. A court may properly apply judicial 
estoppel when the following elements are shown: (1) a party asserts a position 
that is clearly inconsistent with an earlier position; (2) judicial acceptance of 
the inconsistent position would indicate that either the first or second court 
was misled; and (3) the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would 
derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing 
party.134 Although these factors are not exhaustive, they help guide a court’s 
decision. Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial process by 
precluding litigants from “playing fast and loose with the courts” by 
“deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the 
moment.”135 However, judicial estoppel is largely a creature of civil law and 
when it has been applied in criminal cases, it has often been used to prevent 
a defendant from taking a position on appeal which is different from what 
was asserted at trial.136 Despite its current lack of use against prosecutors, 
judicial estoppel could protect defendants from implausible arguments in 
 
132 Ritter, supra note 15, at 835–36. 
133 Id. at 825. The arguments are consistent with scholarship critiquing prosecutors’ use 
of inconsistent theories in cases involving co-defendants. See, e.g., Brandon Buskey, If the 
Convictions Don’t Fit, You Must Acquit: Examining the Constitutional Limitations on the 
State’s Pursuit of Inconsistent Criminal Prosecutions, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 311 
(2012) (proposing that claims of inconsistent prosecutions be analyzed under the framework 
of substantive due process); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and 
Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1423 (2001) 
(arguing a defendant’s right to due process is violated when prosecutors advance inconsistent 
positions in separate proceedings involving the same facts, and exploring theories of party 
admissions, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel as alternative means of barring 
prosecutors from engaging in such conduct); Michael Q. English, Note, A Prosecutor’s Use 
of Inconsistent Factual Theories of a Crime in Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due 
Process Violation?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 525 (1999) (discussing cases in which prosecutors 
argued inconsistent factual theories in successive co-defendant cases and contending this 
violated ethical rules, as well as the defendant’s right to due process). 
134 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001). 
135 Id. at 750 (internal citations omitted).  
136 Ritter, supra note 15, at 840–41. 
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response to exculpatory DNA results. 
Related to judicial estoppel is the doctrine of judicial admissions.137 
Simply stated, a judicial admission withdraws from contention what was 
admitted.138 For example, a court invoked the doctrine of judicial admission 
to bind a defense attorney in a tax fraud case who argued in closing that the 
government had not proven tax returns were filed, to the position that no tax 
returns were filed.139 Courts also have treated a defense attorney’s concession 
during oral argument that the government had proved intoxication as a 
judicial admission settling that issue.140 The doctrine of judicial admission 
should bar prosecutors from arguing that more than one person participated 
in a rape (the “unindicted co-ejaculator” theory) after postconviction DNA 
tests exclude the defendant, if they argued at the defendant’s original trial the 
crime was committed by a single perpetrator.   
A proposal for criminal summary judgment proceedings has also been 
suggested as a pre-trial mechanism to weed out cases where the prosecution 
has alleged facts in the charging document for which it has probable cause, 
but that it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.141 In civil cases, 
parties routinely bring motions for summary judgment to expeditiously 
dispose of meritless claims or defenses and to avoid unnecessary trials.142 
Some jurisdictions allow criminal defendants who have obtained complete 
discovery to move for pre-trial dismissal on the ground that the evidence 
available to the prosecution, even if taken as undisputed, fails to establish a 
prima facie case.143 However, in most jurisdictions, a criminal defendant 
must wait until mid-trial or post-trial to make a motion to dismiss, or a motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.144 The relevant question for a 
court to consider when deciding the mid-trial or post-trial defense motion to 
 
137 See Note, Judicial Admissions, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1121 (1964) (describing courts’ 
application of the judicial admissions doctrine in the context of voluntary and inadvertent 
admissions). 
138 See Brecher v. Gleason, 103 Cal. Rptr. 831, 833 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (“A verified 
assertion in a pleading is a conclusive concession of the truth of the matter pleaded. Such an 
assertion is not treated procedurally as evidence, but it may be relied upon by the parties and 
the court as part of the case.”). 
139 United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991). 
140 United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 1986). 
141 Leonetti, supra note 107, 671–73. 
142 Id. at 671–72. 
143 See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CRIM. PROC. § 14.2(d) (3d ed. 2007) (describing procedures used in 
Vermont, Florida, Minnesota, and Washington).  
144 Leonetti, supra note 107, at 668–69. 
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dismiss is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.”145   
Professor Carrie Leonetti offers a framework for a summary judgment 
procedure for criminal defendants similar to what the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure authorize in civil cases.146 She argues that the rationales for civil 
summary judgment apply with equal, if not greater, force in the criminal law 
arena because criminal cases are “fraught with delay and are certainly 
costly—in terms beyond money—for their participants (defendant, victims, 
witnesses, judges, and juries).”147 Leonetti concludes that defensive summary 
judgment motions would reduce the significant burdens defendants face as a 
result of ongoing criminal prosecutions based on evidence that is insufficient 
to sustain a conviction.148 These consequences are far-reaching and include 
the stigma of arrest and charge, being separated from family and friends 
during pretrial detention, losing employment and liberty while confined pre-
trial, the degradations of imprisonment, and the possibility of wrongful 
conviction.149 
The Rivera Court reversed Rivera’s conviction, finding there was 
insufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.150 In doing 
so, it applied the standard of review utilized by jurisdictions allowing 
criminal defendants to move for pre-trial dismissal and by courts analyzing a 
mid-trial, or post-trial, motion to dismiss.151 The Rivera Court ruled “[a]fter 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold 
that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”152 It is unlikely the proposed reform of 
defensive summary judgment would have prevented Rivera’s 2009 
conviction, because the trial court denied a motion notwithstanding the 
verdict, which employs a similar standard of review. 153  Nonetheless the 
Rivera Court precedent, alongside the doctrines of judicial admission, 
judicial estoppel, and the proposal for criminal summary judgment, offer 
promising means for addressing a prosecutor’s logic-defying response to 
 
145 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979). 
146 Leonetti, supra note 107, at 684–97.  
147 Id. at 673. 
148 Id. at 711–12. 
149 Id. at 711. 
150 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
151 Id. at 60–61. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 60.  
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exculpatory postconviction DNA results and preventing cases based on 
improbable theories of guilt from moving forward to retrial. 
VI. POSTSCRIPT  
On January 6, 2012, at age thirty-nine, Rivera was released from prison 
into a crowd of family and supporters after the State elected not to challenge 
the Rivera Court ruling.154 A few months later, Rivera spoke to law students 
about his wrongful conviction, telling them about the violence he witnessed 
and suffered during the nearly twenty years he was imprisoned. 155  He 
encouraged students to use their education to effect change, noting “You have 
the power to correct a lot of wrong. Never think a person in prison is lost.”156 
Rivera had undergone his own transformation while incarcerated, completing 
his GED, devoting himself to the religious faith he found in prison and 
adopting a strict vegan diet as a result, and learning two languages.157  
Nearly ten months after his exoneration, Rivera filed a federal lawsuit 
against law enforcement officials, alleging police coerced him into falsely 
confessing.158 As the civil proceeding moved forward, additional claims of 
misconduct surfaced. Rivera’s civil attorneys discovered that after his 
conviction, law enforcement found a knife near the crime scene that more 
closely matched the knife wounds inflicted on the victim, and did not tell the 
defense or the prosecution of its existence.159 The knife was subsequently 
destroyed. 160  Moreover, additional DNA testing of Rivera’s gym shoes 
supported a claim the victim’s blood was planted on his shoes.161 Finally, the 
DNA profile obtained from semen found in the victim’s body was matched 
 
154 Ruth Fuller, Andy Grimm & Lisa Black, Rivera Free From Prison: After Nearly 20 
Years and 3 Trials, Lake County Abandons Case, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 2012, at 1.  
155 Lisa Black, Juan Rivera: ‘Never Think a Person in Prison is Lost’: Exonerated Ex-
inmate Tells Law Students About Incarceration, Freedom, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 2012, at 8.  
156 Id.  
157 Ruth Fuller & Dan Hinkel, Juan Rivera: ‘I Never Lived as a Lifer’: Free After Nearly 
20 Years, He Details the Faith, Fears and Hope That Followed Him Out of Prison, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 13, 2012, at 1.  
158 Steve Mills, Lawsuit: Exonerated Man was Set Up, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2012, at 5.  
159 Dan Hinkel & Steve Mills, Police Destroyed Knife Found Near Site of Baby Sitter 
Slaying: Ex-chief Reveals Long-Secret Blade in Unsolved 1992 Case as Ex-inmate Sues 
Authorities, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2014, at 6 [hereinafter Police Destroyed Knife]. 
160 Id. (“[A] knife was found steps from the scene of the crime but destroyed by Waukegan 
police, according to interviews and documents filed in federal court in Chicago.”). 
161 Steve Mills & Dan Hinkel, Rivera Lawsuit: Police Planted Blood on Shoes: New 
Allegations From Man Cleared in the 1992 Killing of 11-Year-Old Holly Staker, CHI. TRIB., 
Dec. 11, 2014, at 1 [hereinafter Police Planted Blood].  
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to a profile retrieved from crime scene evidence in a subsequent 2000 
murder. 162  This match, Rivera’s lawyers suggested, established that the 
State’s focus on Rivera had allowed the actual perpetrator to remain free and 
commit an additional murder.163  
The evidence destruction charge stemmed from the 2014 discovery that 
police recovered a serrated knife two years after Rivera’s arrest from a 
neighbor living next door to the crime scene. 164  The knife was found 
underneath a bush between the neighbor’s house and the murder scene.165 It 
was turned over to police who did not notify Rivera’s attorneys about the 
discovery, and the knife was eventually destroyed.166 The knife, according to 
one of Rivera’s trial attorneys, would have been “invaluable” in discrediting 
the reliability of the confession. 167  During Rivera’s trials, prosecutors 
suggested a broken straight-edged knife, found before Rivera’s arrest, was 
the murder weapon.168 Rivera, in his confession statement, told police he 
broke the knife blade after killing the victim and then discarded the knife.169 
However, no physical evidence matched the broken knife to Rivera.170 The 
presence of a second knife, dissimilar to the knife described in the confession, 
would have undermined the confession, as well as the prosecution’s theory 
of the case.171  
The evidence tampering charge centered on the State’s early claim that 
the victim’s blood was found on Rivera’s shoes. Before the 1993 trial, 
prosecutors reported DNA tests showed Rivera’s sneakers were stained with 
the victim’s blood.172 After the defense indicated it would call a witness to 
testify the sneakers were not for sale at the time of the slaying, the prosecutor 
told the court that he no longer intended to offer this seemingly important 
 
162 Id.  
163 Dan Hinkel & Steve Mills, $20 Million for 20 Lost Years: Juan Rivera’s Settlement 
After DNA Exonerations in 1992 Rape, Murder Thought to be State Record, CHI. TRIB., March 
21, 2015, at 1 [hereinafter $20 Million].  
164 Hinkel & Mills, Police Destroyed Knife, supra note 159.  
165 Id. 
166 Id. There was also no indication police conducted any forensic testing on the knife or 
notified the prosecutor of its discovery. Id. 
167 Id.  
168 Id.  
169 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 24, at 10. 
170 People v. Rivera, 962 N.E.2d 53, 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
171 Hinkel & Mills, Police Destroyed Knife, supra note 159.  
172 Robert Enstad, Blood on Rivera Shoe Matched to Girl, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1993, at 1.  
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incriminating evidence.173 However, neither side addressed how the victim’s 
blood wound up on Rivera’s sneakers if the shoes were not sold before the 
murder.174 Rivera’s civil lawsuit alleged police planted the victim’s blood on 
his shoes.175  His civil lawyers disclosed that recent DNA testing on the 
sneakers detected, for the first time, a second genetic profile mixed in with 
the blood.176 This second profile matched the as-of-yet unidentified suspect, 
whose semen was found in the victim’s body, buttressing the claim 
authorities tampered with evidence.177   
In June 2014, the DNA profile of the unidentified suspect in Rivera’s 
case was matched to a profile obtained from blood on a two-by-four used to 
bludgeon a victim in a 2000 crime.178 In this case, the victim was attacked by 
three perpetrators who broke into his home, beat him with the two-by-four, 
doused him with gasoline, and set him on fire.179 He died two years later as a 
result of injuries sustained during the attack. 180  Police arrested Marvin 
Williford after the victim’s girlfriend identified him as the assailant wielding 
the two-by-four.181 After he was convicted, Williford, who maintained his 
innocence and never confessed to the crime, sought a new trial based on the 
DNA results from the two-by-four. 182  Prosecutors opposed his request, 
arguing an eyewitness identified Williford as one of the three attackers, and 
countering the DNA results by stating the board was handled by many 
people.183 Although Williford’s postconviction proceedings have not been 
resolved, 184 the DNA match between the two crimes illustrates the harm that 
occurs when an innocent person is convicted and the true perpetrator remains 
 
173 Mills & Hinkel, Police Planted Blood, supra note 161. A defense investigator 
discovered the sneakers were not available in the country at the time of the crime and tracked 
down the cash register tape showing the purchase took place after the slaying. Id.  
174 Id.  
175 Id.  
176 Id. 
177 Id.  
178 Steve Mills & Dan Hinkel, Same DNA Detected at Scenes of 2 Killings: Mystery 
Unfolds amid Lake County’s Prosecution Woes, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 2014, at 1. Despite the 
match, the identity of the potential suspect remains unknown, because the genetic profile has 
not yet matched that of any of convicted felon in the DNA database. 
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Id.  
182 Id.  
183 Jim Newton & Dan Hinkel, Lake County Not Releasing Man Convicted in N. Chicago 
Slaying: DNA Evidence Links Weapon in Alleged Crime to Suspect in a Different Murder, 
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2015, at 9.  
184 Hinkel & Mills, $20 Million, supra note 163.  
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free to commit additional crimes. 
In March 2015, Rivera reached a $20 million settlement with the 
authorities named in his civil lawsuit, bringing to a conclusion the legal 
proceedings in his more than twenty-year quest for justice.185 “No amount of 
money could ever sum up to twenty years in prison,” Rivera said after the 
settlement was announced.186 The harm to public safety and the erosion of 
confidence in the system caused by convicting innocent defendants are also 
not quantifiable. 
This article has explored different measures to prevent cases like 
Rivera’s, which are based on logic-defying theories of prosecution, from 
moving forward. Recording interrogations during the investigation phase 
provides a measure of police and prosecutorial accountability. Reforms to 
guard against charging innocent suspects, and pre-trial measures to prevent 
the State from advancing inconsistent theories or proceeding to trial on 
insufficient evidence, provide additional safeguards. However, as Rivera’s 
case illustrates, prosecutors, as elected officials, are ultimately answerable to 
the citizenry.  
Rivera’s civil lawyers said when announcing the $20 million settlement 
that taxpayers in Lake County should be aware “that there’s a serious price 
to pay when police and other actors in the criminal justice system violate 
individual rights.”187 In the words of Rob Warden, Rivera’s case “is just one 
of the very highly problematic cases that have been prosecuted in defiance of 
common sense and overwhelming physical evidence, especially DNA 
evidence . . . . The people of Lake County need to wake up to what their 
prosecutors are doing.”188 Warden, an award-winning journalist, author, and 
former Executive Director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions at 
Northwestern University School of Law, has used the power of narrative and 
his extraordinary investigative journalism skills to shine a light on 
miscarriages of justice. In doing so, he has ensured there will be fewer arrests, 
prosecutions, and convictions of innocent persons, and increased the 
likelihood that prosecutors will exercise common sense when evaluating 
exculpatory DNA results. 
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186 Id.  
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188 Steve Mills & Cynthia Dizikes, Ruling: ‘Nightmare of Wrongful Incarceration’: 
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